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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3060th meeting, on 17 March 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 746 (1992) concerning the situation in Somalia. The full text of the resolution reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/23693),

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, including agreements for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Deeply regretting that the factions have not yet abided by their commitment to implement the cease-fire and thus have still not permitted the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the people in need in Somalia,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the factors described in paragraph 76 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23693) must be taken into account,

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General;

2. Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

3. Urges all the Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population in Somalia;

5. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to and to cooperate with these humanitarian relief efforts;

6. Strongly supports the Secretary-General's decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, accompanied by the coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of his report (S/23693) and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter;

7. Requests that the technical team also develop a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8. Calls on all parties, movements and factions in Mogadishu in particular, and in Somalia in general, to respect fully the security and safety of the technical team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

9. Calls upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference for national reconciliation and unity in Somalia;

10. Calls upon all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

11. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to the above resolution.

3. Immediately following the adoption of the above resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the Somali factions as well as to Member States, humanitarian organizations and the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

4. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, I appointed, on 20 March 1992, Mr. David Bassiouni as Coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the affected population in all parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international humanitarian organizations.

5. On 20 March 1992, I also appointed a 15-member Technical Team to visit Somalia, accompanied by the Coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of my earlier report to the Security Council. 1/ The Technical Team was led by Mr. Robert Gallagher and included representatives from LAS, OAU, OIC and from a non-governmental organization.

The cease-fire in Mogadishu

6. The cease-fire agreed to by the two factions in Mogadishu came into effect on 3 March 1992. Afcer about a month of relative calm, the cease-fire was violated by the resumption of fighting between some units belonging to the two factions. However, the leaders of the two factions moved quickly to stop the fighting and to re-establish the cease-fire.

7. Since then, there has been little, if any, fighting between the two factions in Mogadishu. However, some sporadic shooting and incidents of apparent banditry by armed elements not under the control of either faction have been reported. The frequency of such incidents themselves has decreased appreciably during the past several weeks.

8. The cease-fire in Mogadishu has created a new and positive political climate which has made it possible for representatives of the two factions in Mogadishu to meet in the context of the agreement and arrangements concluded with them by the joint delegation last March. On 12 April, representatives of the two factions met face to face for the first time at United Nations offices in Mogadishu to discuss the formation of a joint committee for relief assistance, under the chairmanship of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance. Similarly, the chiefs of staff of the two factions have also met in connection with the monitoring of the cease-fire and the agreements reached on ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need in and around Mogadishu.

9. Despite the favourable developments in Mogadishu and its environs, I am very concerned about the increased fighting and the deteriorating security situation in the northern part of the country. The situation in the southern part of the country also continues to be tense and the potential for fighting among the contending factions and groups is also a matter of grave concern. Taking these developments into account, the Security Council may wish to consider calling for a general cease-fire throughout the country. Such action by the Security Council, in addition to helping to bring to an end the fighting in the different parts of the country, would create a situation conducive to the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

Activities of the Technical Team

10. The Technical Team assembled in Nairobi on 21 March 1992, and held discussions the following day with representatives of the United Nations agencies and of non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia.

Consultations in Mogadishu

11. The Technical Team arrived in Mogadishu on 23 March and held separate meetings with General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), and Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. During these meetings, the Technical Team discussed with the two parties the objectives of its mission pursuant to Security Council resolution 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992. It also drew the attention of the two parties to paragraphs 3 and 8 of the resolution, by which the Security Council urged them to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia and to respect fully the security and safety and guarantee the complete freedom of movement of the Technical Team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations in Mogadishu.

12. General Aidid stated that USC was observing the cease-fire and reiterated the reservation of his faction to the stationing of a peace-keeping force in Mogadishu or to any identifiable United Nations military presence. He called on the international community to provide humanitarian assistance, especially food for distribution by USC.

13. On his part, Interim President Mohamed emphasized that it was impossible for security and stability to be realized in Mogadishu without a large contingent of a United Nations peace-keeping force. He said that without such a United Nations military presence, the cease-fire would not hold and effective distribution of food and other supplies would not be possible.

14. Following further discussions with the Technical Team, the two leaders signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadishu (annexes I A and I B). Also attached is a document submitted by Interim President Mohamed (annex I C).

15. Subsequent to the signing of the Agreements, the Technical Team travelled to Hargeisa on 29 March. It met separately with Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, and a group of Elders led by Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, the Chief of the Constitutional Elders, as well as with a group of Colonels of the army of the Somali National Movement (SNM).

16. Both Mr. Ahmed Ali and the Elders stated that the entire northern region of Somalia was in need of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development. They said that assistance was also needed to facilitate the demobilization of the army of SNM to help establish security and stability in the region (see annexes II A and II B). Attached also is a document submitted by the Minister of Planning and Development of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland (annex II C).

17. Owing to the deteriorating security situation in Berbera, it was not possible for the Technical Team to visit that city.

18. The Technical Team was also unable to visit Bossasso. However, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, the Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), met the Technical Team in Djibouti on 29 March. The General stated that the north-eastern part of the country was relatively calm but was in need of rehabilitation, development and humanitarian assistance. He raised the question of the need for food assistance to armed elements to help maintain peace and stability in the region. On 29 March 1992, General Abshir Musse signed an Agreement (annex III A). Also annexed is a document submitted by SSDF (annex III B).

19. On 31 March, in Kismayo, the Technical Team met with General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, Chairman of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and General Mohamed Said Hersi (Morgan), Commander of the Armed Forces of SPM. The Technical Team also met with the Elders of the area. In addition to requesting humanitarian assistance, the Elders called on the United Nations to help in achieving a comprehensive cease-fire throughout Somalia. The agreement signed by General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu is annexed (annex IV A). A separate agreement was signed by the Elders (annex IV B).

20. On the same day, the Technical Team met with a delegation representing former President Siad Barre. The delegation stated that the south-western region of Somalia had been ignored despite the existence of many displaced people and starvation in the area. It urged the United Nations to send a mission to the area.

21. During its stay in Somalia, the Technical Team also met with representatives of non-governmental organizations in the country.

Monitoring of the cease-fire and delivery of humanitarian assistance

22. The agreements reached in Mogadishu with Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid (annexes I A and I B) require the United Nations:

(a) To deploy United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire;

(b) To deploy United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities in continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance in and around Mogadishu.

23. I have thought carefully about the type of personnel which would be best equipped to perform these two functions, taking into account the following factors:

(a) The traditions of United Nations observer missions (which are specifically referred to in the Agreements);

(b) The nature of the tasks to be performed;

(c) The security conditions in Mogadishu;

(d) The concerns of the Governments which would be asked to make the necessary personnel available to serve in the United Nations operations in Somalia;

(e) The views expressed to the Technical Team by its interlocutors in Mogadishu.

I have also borne in mind that under the Agreements the United Nations is to consult with the parties before determining the number of security personnel required for the protection function.

24. As regards the monitoring of the cease-fire, there is no doubt, on the basis of the long experience of the United Nations, that this is a function for which military skills are required. Only military officers are trained to assess and interpret the positions and moves of the forces of the two sides, to conduct the necessary investigations when violations of the cease-fire occur and to reach convincing conclusions about where responsibility lies and how future violations can be avoided. Military skills are also required to

enable observers to operate in potential battle zones and take care of their own safety, without unnecessarily impairing their ability to carry out their tasks. I conclude that the cease-fire in Mogadishu should be monitored, in the traditional United Nations mannner, by a group of military observers. They would be 50 in number, in accordance with the agreements.

25. These observers would form mobile teams, each consisting of three observers with one vehicle. In the existing conditions in Mogadishu, their ability to undertake mobile patrols would depend on the security situation. Initially, they would all be based in the headquarters of the United Nations mission. Once the security conditions had improved, the observers would be grouped in observation posts located in the vicinity of the headquarters or other offices of the two parties and, in some cases, at United Nations agency or non-governmental organization sites, taking into account the situation on the ground, the security of the military observers and their need for tolerable living conditions.

26. In accordance with the agreements, 25 of the observers would be stationed on one side of Mogadishu and 25 on the other. As is normal in such missions, they would not be armed and would wear their national uniforms with United Nations insignia. It would be the responsibility of the forces of the two sides to ensure their security at all times. Indeed the mission's ability to carry out its mandate would, to a large extent, depend on such cooperation from the two parties. Discussions were also initiated by the technical mission to obtain such cooperation from other groups and the point will be pursued if the Security Council decides to establish the mission recommended in the present report.

27. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the Agreements would be required to provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the port of Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in Mogadishu and its immediate environs. They would also, as necessary, provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the airports in Mogadishu. In this case also, I have come to the conclusion that these tasks require military skills and training.

28. The threat to United Nations activities both at the port of Mogadishu and elsewhere in the city comes from a variety of armed elements - many of whom are not under the control of any political authority - and who have been attempting to control food supplies in the capital. The United Nations security personnel will not have any law-and-order responsibilities vis-à-vis these armed elements. Their task will be to provide the United Nations convoys of relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack and to fire effectively in self-defence if deterrence should not prove effective.

29. The Technical Team recommended accordingly that the security personnel should take the form of infantry organized in the normal manner. They would be based at Mogadishu port and would undertake their patrols in light

vehicles, with a small armoured car element being held in reserve in the port to be used in case of emergencies. The infantry would wear national uniform with United Nations insignia and would be armed. It is estimated that a strength of approximately 500 all ranks would be required but, as noted above, the agreements require that the two parties be consulted about this figure before the plan is finalized.

30. Given the lack of suitable accommodation in Mogadishu at the present time, as well as security considerations, the security personnel would as far as possible be accommodated on a ship which would perform the functions of a base camp, including the provision of logistic support to the mission.

31. The above arrangements represent the requirement for Mogadishu. Should it be decided to undertake similar functions elsewhere in Somalia, additional personnel would be required.

32. In addition to the observers and security personnel, the mission would require the usual civilian administrative support services, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer. Its vehicles would have distinctive United Nations colours and markings. It would require its own telecommunications links for internal and external communications. Under present conditions in Mogadishu it is unlikely that the parties would be able to provide the mission with goods and services required for the implementation of its mandate. They have, however, undertaken to give its personnel full and unrestricted freedom of movement within the areas they control.

33. If the Security Council decides to set up a mission on the lines described above, I would recommend that it be known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. Command of UNOSOM in the field would be entrusted to a Commanding Officer with the rank of Brigadier-General, who would be appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the two parties and with the consent of the Security Council. The Commanding Officer would report to the Secretary-General in the manner recommended in paragraph 64 below. The Secretary-General would report regularly to the Security Council on all matters relating to the scope and efficient functioning of UNOSOM. The military personnel of UNOSOM would be contributed by Governments of Member States at the request of the Secretary-General, after consultation with the parties and with the approval of the Security Council.

Humanitarian assistance

34. Security Council resolution 746 (1992) also requested that the Technical Team develop a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. As a result of this request and after consultations with relevant United Nations agencies, the Technical Team has established mechanisms to implement the Mogadishu portion of an initial 90-day Plan of Action as well as arrangements to facilitate delivery

of humanitarian assistance to other parts of the country. (The Plan is issued as an addendum to the present report.)

35. The need for effective coordination and a commitment to collaboration are of particular importance in the type of crisis prevalent throughout most of Somalia today. It is for that reason that I had instructed the United Nations agencies involved in the delivery of relief assistance to Somalia to work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations in drawing up the 90-day Plan of Action.

36. The Plan forms the basis for immediate action to deliver food and non-food relief assistance to an estimated 1.5 million people most immediately at risk. In addition, the Plan also targets assistance for a further 3.5 million people who are in need of food, seeds and basic health and water services. This latter group includes many thousands of soldiers and other armed groups who will be assisted through multifaceted disarmament and demobilization programmes so that they can be reintegrated into civilian life. The present crisis facing the people of Somalia also has regional consequences as already evidenced by the flow of refugees from Somalia into Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia and there are grave concerns about the effect such population movements will have on the Horn of Africa.

37. The estimates of populations to be assisted have been included in the Plan. Also built into the Plan is a process of relief programme evaluations as well as inter-agency/non-governmental organization assessments. These will be used to update requirements and to identify new areas of need.

38. Implementation of the Plan, as well as the continuity of expanded humanitarian relief and recovery efforts, require that United Nations agencies expand their presence throughout Somalia, under the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia based in Mogadishu. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have made great efforts to build up their programmes over the past six months. This new phase of expansion of United Nations activities will require not only the active involvement of the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia in emergency relief and recovery operations, but also the establishment of offices throughout the country where the United Nations will be providing humanitarian assistance. In this connection, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is providing full direct support to the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia in the form of staff, office accommodation, administrative and logistical backstopping, including aircraft. The United Nations Volunteers programme is currently planning to make available up to 50 experts in the field of logistics, communications, health care and agricultural services to support the humanitarian effort in Somalia.

39. Although the present security situation in Mogadishu remains precarious, the needs of almost 700,000 people, 250,000 of whom are displaced and a further 80,000 representing highly vulnerable groups, make the provision of humanitarian assistance of paramount importance. Hence, over the next

90 days, WFP and ICRC will take the lead in shipments of food to the port of Mogadishu, while UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), ICRC and non-governmental organizations will provide increased supplies of non-food assistance. As regards WFP, food assistance will arrive at the port of Mogadishu as soon as arrangements recommended by the Technical Team are in place or conditions in the area of Mogadishu are deemed propitious by the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia for food aid deliveries and distribution. It is anticipated that the WFP/CARE free food distribution programme will also be used by authorities to undertake demobilization activities, and to enhance the security arrangements that will enable continuous and unimpeded supplies of relief assistance. Precise modalities still need to be formulated and agreed. If the security situation in and around Mogadishu is adequate and "corridors" and "zones of peace" are respected, UNICEF, WHO, ICRC and non-governmental organizations will also seek to increase their non-food relief activities.

40. In other areas of the country, United Nations agencies, ICRC and non-governmental organizations will collaborate closely not only on means to provide emergency relief assistance to affected populations, but also to generate, wherever possible, economic recovery and to promote demobilization and disarmament programmes. In this regard, economic recovery must be seen as part of the mechanisms essential to promote stability throughout the country. Without seeds, tools, and livestock revitalization programmes, hundreds of thousands of Somalis will have no recourse than to seek sustenance and security across borders.

41. In the central region, ICRC has expressed its intention to continue to provide assistance to the displaced and other highly vulnerable groups through the coastal ports of Merca, Adale and Obbia, while UNICEF will supply health education materials, as well as materials for health facilities and equipment. In the north-west of Somalia, the Plan includes not only food assistance, but also the establishment by UNDP and UNICEF of basic school facilities; and the creation by WHO of health training programmes. De-mining programmes at present supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be supplemented by UNDP in the very near future.

42. UNHCR has pre-positioned food and other supplies in preparation for repatriation programmes for Somali refugees returning from Ethiopia as well as complementing the work of non-governmental organizations and other agencies in the rehabilitation of essential services in the health and water sectors. Revitalization of north-eastern Somalia's livestock trade is essential if affected populations are to escape dependency upon relief, and hence, the Plan will provide through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and ICRC means to ensure the quality of livestock for export. In the south-east of the country, an increasing number of displaced people require basic relief assistance, and here, United Nations agencies, ICRC and non-governmental organizations intend to cover a range of food and non-food needs.

43. These initiatives will incorporate the needs of those groups, such as 250,000 Bantu people, who have no affiliation with traditional clan structures. Of rapidly growing concern are the estimated 200,000 Somalis who now have gathered in south-western Somalia along the Somali-Kenya border. Assistance through ICRC, UNHCR and non-governmental organizations will be essential to help stop the exacerbation of their plight.

44. There are important basic economic programmes incorporated into the Plan which address the particular needs of Somali youth and women. Throughout the Plan, emphasis is also placed upon providing assistance in part through traditional clan structures. This would require conventional forms of accountability to be reconsidered. On their part, the Somali clan leaders must recognize the responsibility which the international community has placed upon them.

45. The effectiveness of the 90-day Plan of Action and subsequent emergency relief and recovery programmes will be determined by all parties' observance of basic principles of international humanitarian assistance. Therefore, it must be fully recognized that distribution of relief assistance will be based upon equity and need, and in no way bound by political or geographical considerations. Furthermore, it must be accepted that designated "corridors" as well as "zones of peace" must be maintained to ensure the passage and distribution of food and non-food assistance. Thus, the inviolability of United Nations-flagged ships, aircraft and relief convoys and protection of relief workers passing to and through designated corridors to zones of peace is a fundamental prerequisite. These zones include seaports, airports and areas in which United Nations and non-governmental organization activities are under way. Finally, these principles should be understood as incorporating the activities and security of all non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance.

46. It should be noted that the implementation of this Plan will fundamentally depend not only upon adequate security within Somalia, but also upon the provision of sufficient resources by the international community to fund its activities.

Arms embargo

47. In my previous report to the Council, 1/ I provided information on measures being taken to implement a general and complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. I reported to the Council that notwithstanding replies received from 68 Governments stating that they were strictly observing the arms embargo, both factions in Mogadishu had claimed that the other side was receiving arms from some of the countries in the region. Since my last report, a further 14 replies have been received from Governments, which have been issued as documents of the Security Council. 2/

48. However, various reports indicate that arms continue to flow into the country. In view of this, the Security Council might wish to consider putting into place the appropriate arrangements for the monitoring of the arms embargo.

49. In addition, there is a pressing need to recover the enormous number of small and medium-sized arms which are already in the hands of the civilian population throughout Somalia, and particularly in Mogadishu. My representatives have twice raised with Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid the possibility of arrangements under which the United Nations could exchange arms for food, i.e., individuals or groups who voluntarily handed in their weapons and ammunition would receive food in exchange. This has always struck me as an imaginative way of tackling the two most acute problems facing the people of Somalia today, namely the threat of famine and an almost total breakdown of law and order. It would, however, have to be managed as an addition to, and not a substitute for, existing programmes for delivery of humanitarian relief to those in need.

50. Programmes for the provision of supplementary humanitarian assistance could be initiated for those armed individuals who agree voluntarily to surrender their weapons. Arrangements could also be made for the subsequent destruction of the weapons. It is my intention to continue the discussions on this subject and I shall keep the Council informed of my efforts.

National reconciliation

51. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cease-fire and the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have throughout continued to pursue efforts for national reconciliation in Somalia as called for in paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 746 (1992), and have, to this end, kept in contact with LAS, OAU and OIC.

52. In my last report, I informed the Council that in addition to discussing the matter with the leaders of the two factions in Mogadishu, the joint delegation that visited Somalia in late February and early March had also held consultations on this matter in Kismayo and in Nairobi with representatives of the Somali National Front (SNF), SPM, the United Somali Party (USP), SSDF and the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) and with several other Somali groups and individuals.

53. Since then, my representatives and I have had further discussions on this matter with the Somali factions, groups and movements. Earlier this month, I also had consultations in New York with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of OAU, on ways and means of expediting the arrangements for convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

54. During the Security Council's consideration of the situation in Somalia on 17 March 1992, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of General Ibrahim Babangida, President of Nigeria and current Chairman of OAU, expressed his country's readiness to host the conference in Abuja under the auspices of the United Nations, LAS, OAU and OIC. Subsequently, in a letter dated 19 March 1992 addressed to me, the Foreign Minister stated that his Government was prepared to provide the necessary transportation for the representatives of the Somali factions, groups and movements who would participate in the conference.

55. In order to achieve further progress on this matter, it will be necessary to continue efforts to assist the various parties, movements and factions to agree among themselves on their representation to the conference on national reconciliation. My efforts, and those of my representatives, will continue to give high priority to this aspect as well as to the modalities for the convening of the conference, including its agenda, participation and venue.

Observations

56. The situation in Somalia continues to be of great concern to the international community. There is hardly any governmental infrastructure in the country that could be relied upon. Physical infrastructure, such as transport, water, electricity, telephone communications, is also largely non-existent. Banditry is widespread and there is wide proliferation of weapons. The crisis in Somalia has regional consequences, as is already evidenced by the flow of Somali refugees to neighbouring countries, and there are grave concerns about the destabilizing effects it could have on the Horn of Africa.

57. The cease-fire in Mogadishu arranged between Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid in March is holding, although sporadic shooting and incidents of apparent banditry are putting a strain on it. The port of Mogadishu and the international airport are in the control of groups not under the command of either major faction. Although clans and sub-clans claim to be in control of certain areas, definitive military or paramilitary organizations at the clan or sub-clan level are almost non-existent.

58. As I pointed out in my report of 11 March 1992 to the Security Council, the tragic situation in Somalia, with its extraordinary complexities, has so far eluded conventional solutions. The need to expand ongoing humanitarian assistance calls for the exploration of innovative methods, commensurate with the humanitarian and political situation. In this regard, the Security Council's decision to relate the modalities of a cease-fire to the implementation of humanitarian relief operations is noteworthy.

59. The threat of dramatic food shortages amongst particularly vulnerable groups is becoming increasingly acute. The lack of clean water, primary health care services and control of communicable diseases is exacerbating the crisis. Owing to the persistent efforts of non-governmental organizations, supported in part by United Nations agencies, some basic health, water and disease control services have been provided, but these efforts need to be intensified. Access to the main ports and acceptance of the principle of "corridors" and "zones of peace" would enable the United Nations and non-governmental organizations to provide more humanitarian assistance.

60. Although the difficulties of providing relief assistance are fully recognized, the prevailing crisis in Somalia poses a paradox which must be addressed: without security, relief assistance programmes will continue to be severely constrained; but without relief assistance programmes, the prospects

for security are at best precarious. Therefore, the necessity of providing humanitarian assistance even before the full complement of United Nations security personnel and cease-fire modalities are in place must be emphasized. However, I wish to emphasize to all parties in Somalia that an expanded United Nations relief effort cannot be authorized without assurances from them for the security of United Nations relief workers and supplies. I appeal to all parties to honour agreements made with the Technical Team to facilitate the expanded delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensure the safe passage of all those engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

61. I attach great importance to the Plan submitted by the agencies. I am convinced that with the cooperation of all concerned, the Plan would provide a sound basis for meeting the request of the Security Council for a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

62. After careful consideration of the situation, I recommend to the Security Council to consider establishing a mission along the lines described in paragraphs 22 to 33 above. This will be for an initial period of six months.

63. I shall circulate shortly an addendum to the present report which will contain the preliminary cost estimate for UNOSOM.

64. As regards national reconciliation, keeping in mind the consideration mentioned in paragraphs 51 to 55 above and the need to expedite matters in this regard, I intend to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to assist me in the consultations and arrangements for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia, in close cooperation with the regional organizations. The Special Representative will also provide overall direction to the United Nations activities recommended in this report including those directed at economic recovery and rehabilitation, as well as demobilization and disarmament programmes in Somalia. The Commanding Officer and the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance will carry out their duties under the supervision of the Special Representative and will report through him to the Secretary-General. However, at times when the Special Representative is not present in Somalia, each of them will report direct to Headquarters, while maintaining the closest possible cooperation in the field. Finally, I wish to reiterate my appreciation to the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference for their continued cooperation and support for my efforts to resolve the problem in Somalia, and for agreeing to send representatives to Somalia to work closely with their counterparts from the United Nations.

Notes

1/ S/23693 and Corr.1.

2/ S/23701, S/23707, S/23711, S/23713, S/23718, S/23719, S/23720, S/23725, S/23739, S/23746, S/23747, S/23748, S/23750 and S/23778.

Annex I

A. Letter of 27 March 1992 from General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress, to the United Nations

WHEREAS in March 1992, I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman, United Somali Congress, by letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations acknowledged receipt of the Security Council resolution on Somalia (746 (1992)) by which the Security Council

> "Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;
>
> "Urges all Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);"

WHEREAS in that letter to the Secretary-General, I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid expressed our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in Somalia and their efforts to assist Somalia in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in implementing the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992 and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in Somalia;

I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, do hereby agree that

A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE SIGNED 3 MARCH 1992, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF

> "implementation of the measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism", to
>
> 1. The deployment of up to twenty-five (25) observers to each of north and south Mogadishu; and the employment of those observers in accordance with the traditions of United Nations observer missions; that is to say, to monitor without interference the terms of the cease-fire agreement;
>
> 2. Ensure the security of all United Nations observers within my area of influence;
>
> 3. The maintenance of law and order within my area of influence as it might affect the freedom and movement of the United Nations observers in their assigned area of responsibility;

4. Provide the United Nations observers with any and all assistance in the investigation of any violation of the cease-fire; and

5. The formation of a cease-fire monitoring team comprising nine members equally distributed among the two sides and the United Nations, for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to the cease-fire;

B. "UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH (THE SECURITY COUNCIL) ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES"; to

6. Ensure adequate security in and around the Mogadishu port area and handling facilities and management within the port;

7. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of Mogadishu under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace;

8. The deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized;

9. Entrust the United Nations with the task of equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance based on need;

10. The formation of a joint committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

C. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

11. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

D. IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF FOOD SUPPLY

12. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes to land at Mogadishu port approximately 12,000 tons of food and non-food assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes

that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of Somalia.

Signed .....

General Mohamed Farah Aidid
Chairman
United Somali Congress

Date 27.3.1992 Place MOGADISCIO

Witnessed by: .....

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. Letter of 28 March 1992 from Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Interim President of Somalia, to the United Nations

WHEREAS in March 1992, I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Interim President of Somalia, by letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations acknowledged receipt of the Security Council resolution on Somalia (746 (1992)) by which the Security Council

"Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

"Urges all Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);"

WHEREAS in that letter to the Secretary-General, I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, expressed our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in Somalia and their efforts to assist Somalia in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in implementing the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992 and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in Somalia;

I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, do hereby agree that

A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE SIGNED 3 MARCH 1992, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF

"implementation of the measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism", to

1. The deployment of up to twenty-five (25) observers to each of north and south Mogadishu; and the employment of those observers in accordance with the traditions of United Nations observer missions; that is to say, to monitor without interference the terms of the cease-fire agreement;

2. Ensure the security of all United Nations observers within my area of influence;

3. The maintenance of law and order within my area of influence as it might affect the freedom and movement of the United Nations observers in their assigned area of responsibility;

4. Provide the United Nations observers with any and all assistance in the investigation of any violation of the cease-fire; and

5. The formation of a cease-fire monitoring team comprising nine members equally distributed among the two sides and the United Nations for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to the cease-fire;

B. "UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH (THE SECURITY COUNCIL) ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES"; to

6. Ensure adequate security in and around the Mogadishu port area and handling facilities and management within the port;

7. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of Mogadishu under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace;

8. The deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized;

9. Entrust the United Nations with the task of equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance based on need;

10. The formation of a joint committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

C. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

11. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

D. IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF FOOD SUPPLY

12. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes to land at Mogadishu port approximately 12,000 tons of food and non-food assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes

that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of Somalia.

Signed .....

Ali Mahdi Mohamed

Interim President of Somalia

Date. 28/3/92 ..... Place. Mogadiscio ..

Witnessed by: ..... Robert M. Gallagher .....

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to
Somalia including representatives of the
Organization of African Unity, the League
of Arab States and the Organization
of the Islamic Conference

C. Document submitted by Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed

(1)

SOMALI REPUBLIC

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

25 March 1992

Somalia, from its birth as a nation, has had an historic traditional relationship with the United Nations. Pursuing that remarkable relationship which our people acknowledge, we are still confident that the United Nations will continue assisting Somalia specially today that our people are going through a very critical period. The assistance our people need today is much broader than anything compared to the past history. However, we are hereby extending an appeal to the United Nations and the entire free world to urgently send to Somalia an international contingent in order to save this nation from total destruction. With the help of the United Nations, Somalia needs peace to reign in the whole country and bring back the constitutional order to effectively work.

If, as per our request, the United Nations decides to agree to sending us that contingent, such forces should be from NATO-EEC countries or from the League of Arab States, OAU and OIC. The proposed contingent will be performing their tasks in Mogadishu and surrounding areas at the first stage and then it will be utilized to restore stability in the entire country. We suggest that the contingent must have the below-indicated military equipment:

1. A mechanized infantry brigade (on APC) consisting of 2,500 men with their supporting elements and logistics unit.

2. Two light armoured cavalry regiments of 1,000 men.

3. A tank battalion (54 M60 tanks) with about 250 men.

4. One self-propelled artillery battalion composed of 6 pieces of 155 mm 109 and 12 pieces of 105 mm with 200 men.

5. A small air wing group composed of:

   (a) 4-6 helicopter gunships,

   (b) 2-4 small aircraft.

The total number of the forces should be 4,500 men.

(2)

RESPONSIBILITIES AND DIVISION OF THE FORCES

- One mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy Halane Military School and its duty shall be to secure the security and safety of the airport, the Military Aviation Garrison, the fuel depot and the Gezira Power Station.

- A mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy the Military Navy Garrison (inside the old port) and their duty shall be to assure the security of the seaport, Central Bank and the Post and Telecommunication Building.

- A mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy National Police Headquarters and their duty shall be to assure the security of Radio Mogadishu, the State House (Villa Somalia) and the Central Power Station.

- One armoured cavalry regiment will occupy the Military Academy and its duty shall be to ensure the security of the radio transmitter station and the water wells of both Afgoi and Balad.

- One light armoured cavalry regiment with a tank company shall occupy Deganley (28 kilometres north of Mogadishu) and its duty shall be to ensure the security, order and stability of the triangle Mogadishu-Afgoi-Balad and shall constitute to perform the Capital's external defence.

- An artillery group and a tank battalion (less a company) shall be located respectively in the first and second Artillery and Tank Garrisons. This team shall be reserve for the Division Command.

- A small air wing group shall be located in the military aviation garrison and shall also be a reserve team for the Division Command.

ALI MAHDI MOHAMED

Interim President of the Somali Republic

/...

Annex II

A. Letter of agreement addressed by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali to the United Nations on 29 March 1992

WHEREAS I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;

2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

Signed .....

Date 29/3/92 Place HARGEISA

Witnessed by: Robert M. Gallagher

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

/...

B. Letter of agreement addressed by Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, Chief of the Constitutional Elders to the United Nations on 29 March 1992

WHEREAS I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, Chief of the Constitutional Elders, do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;

2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

Signed ... SH. IBRAHIM SH. YUSUF SH. NADER

Date 27th March 1992 Place ... Hargeisa

Witnessed by: ... Robert M Gallagher

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

/...

C. Situation report on Somaliland (27 March 1992)

SNM started the fight against the dictatorship in 1981, and continued the struggle until its downfall in 1991.

After the SNM took control of the whole north (referred to here as Somaliland) in February 1991, there have been two very important developments without which the creation of Somaliland would have been stillborn.

1. The clan reconciliation meeting at Berbera

All clan leaders were invited on 27 March 1991 to attend a conference at Berbera, to air their grievances and hopes. This very historic meeting served to give a signal that all clans in Somaliland crave peace after such a long civil strife in which tens of thousands lost their lives and property, and whose traumatic experiences haunt even today all sections of the community, army, civilian, both young and old alike. The elders decided after due deliberation that there should be reconciliation between SNM supporters and non-supporters; that the communities pursue their respective grievance against each other through peaceful process and good-neighbourliness. This meeting has shown both the Somali traditional method of governance and the clan elders' role at their best.

2. Elders meeting adjoined with scheduled central committee meeting

After an important clan elders meeting took place in Burao in May 1991, a scheduled central committee conference followed to discuss and approve the clan elders' pivotal resolution:

The rebirth of Somaliland as an independent state

The elders had earlier meticulously sought the advice of their constituents, underlining the political importance of the decision. The elders reported as had been confirmed by mass demonstrations in the main towns, the overwhelming support of the majority of Somaliland people for the rebirth of sovereign Somaliland. The central committee duly approved the measure and officially declared Somaliland as an independent state as of 16 May 1991. Ten days later, 26 May 1991, the central committee voted for the chairman of SNM, Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, as the first President of the newly born state. Mr. Hassan Essa Jama was voted as his first Vice-President; 17 cabinet ministers with portfolios going to all the main clans of Somaliland. There had been grumbles, even then from certain politicians whose aspirations have not been met, which could contribute in due course to the formation of opposition factions. However, the majority of the people of Somaliland were supportive of the government, euphoric with the heady fruits of freedom. A criticism against the policy of the government was seen as a sign of disrespect for Somaliland and was roundly condemned. The government succeeded with the vital help of the public and clan elders, to improve the security and well-being of all persons and their properties. Guns were rarely

seen on the main streets of major cities, and robberies were drastically curtailed. A foreign observer would have noticed the significant and upward swing of the chances of Somaliland as a viable state:

The improvement in security;

The movement of goods and people between the region;

The smooth re-establishment of vital trade in livestock to Gulf States which earned at least six million United States dollars in the first six months after independence;

The freedom of the opposition to air their views in public places, the radio and immediately proliferating local newspapers;

The improved relations with neighbouring countries in the region and the Horn. All boded well for Somaliland.

These achievements, though basic, would be very significant considering the constraints under which Somaliland laboured. The virtual destruction of the country's economy and infrastructure; the almost total lack of government resources, material and manpower; the hundred of thousands of unemployed youth; the substantial reduction of the remittances for most Somaliland families from the Gulf; the slow international humanitarian assistance; the high expectation of the public and promises of largesse after independence, all worked against Somaliland.

Despite all these major obstacles, the people were starting to rebuild their homes, the markets were flourishing and most people were hopeful of a fresh start in their brutally disrupted lives. But even at this early stage, observers warned of the fragility of peace which was pivotal for the survival of Somaliland as a state.

They cited the increasing number of spontaneous returnees cracking on the back of an already overburdened system; the lack of agreement on methods of demobilization and the creation of a small and responsive loyal national army; the signs of a deepening disillusionment among the unpaid government employees, i.e., teachers, doctors, etc.; which manifested itself in the increasing number of absentees as the virtual desertion of some ministries.

Present security situation of Somaliland

The security situation in Somaliland has seriously deteriorated recently after an initial period of relative stability. The first cracks in the stability of the country appeared during the heavy factional fighting in the central major town of Burao in early January 1992, which led to the evacuation of the majority of its population. This incident coincided and in a sense heralded a tense period on the whole bloodless, confrontation between armed clan-based factions at Berbera and elsewhere. These were followed by the

looting of stocks of food, medical supplies, equipment, etc., belonging to United Nations agencies and international NGOs at Berbera port. The lawlessness spread to other parts of the country and was dramatized by the looting of vehicles belonging to NGOs at Hargaisa and in certain cases the breaking into their premises and sacking of their homes. There has been also increasing incidence of harassment of commercial vehicles plying the roads between major towns. So far, however, except for the Burao incident there has been minimal loss of life and private property and commerce is still protected by an unwritten but tribal understanding. Needless to say, if the present anarchy and confrontational, factional politicking continues, as it is all likely to do, there will ensue a lot of bloodshed and human suffering of the greatest magnitude.

Factors that led to the breakdown of security of Somaliland

The present deterioration of security in Somaliland arose out of complex, interacting social, economic and historical reasons which, inter alia, include the following:

- The proliferation of heavily armed clan militia. The youth who are predominant in these militia have been traumatized by years of bloody conflict and the peculiar brutalities of civil war. They have missed their schooling and normal upbringing and now face a bleak future of joblessness and redundancy. Their unrealistically high expectation of the "spoils" of victory have been dashed and as a result they are bitter and determined to settle scores with their guns for material gain, disregarding traditional values such as sanctity of life and property.

- The presence of vast quantities of arms of all sizes and description, the legacy of the dictatorship's policy of stockpiling of arms.

- The clan system is the mainspring of Somali culture and identity. It has been useful in its traditional, pastoral setting and even today it is an instrument of survival during times of deep trouble and provides a safety net for the poorest and most vulnerable. However, it has its negative dark side and is in a sense irreconcilable with a modern, democratic state. Clan politicking is playing havoc with Somaliland security and stability at present.

- The total and almost unprecedented destruction of the economy and infrastructure of an already extremely underdeveloped country (Somaliland), is and shall continue to be a destabilizing factor, specially in combination with other socio-political crisis as is the case at present.

- It has proven difficult to establish a government or central authority in Somaliland. Though the people are committed to peace and the sovereignty of Somaliland and deeply yearn for stability and normality, it has not been possible so far to establish a viable system of government. This has been due to many factors some of them mentioned above and others include the lack of stabilizing institutions. The absolute lack of financial resources and the legacy of the dictatorship which destroyed both traditional values and the people's belief in government as well as the self-respect and morale of the professional cadres.

- The lack of meaningful and massive response from the international community at the time when the devastated country had miraculous though relative stability had been most unfortunate and in a sense contributed to the present crisis, not the least because of the high expectations of the people that had been dashed. Timely intervention then, in strengthening the capacity of the government and the demobilization process could conceivably have averted the present crisis, though admittedly the task was daunting even then.

Recommendations

The most critical problem facing the country at the present is securing the peace, which is a precondition to the tackling of the multitude of socio-economic crises besetting Somaliland. Due to the magnitude of destruction that has occurred and the bewildering complexity of socio-economic problems, that mostly originated from the long bloody civil conflict and the excesses of the dictatorship, it is impossible to secure the peace without a massive and determined intervention of the international community. We therefore appeal to the United Nations to help us in the demobilization process in which feeding the Mujaahidiin is an integral part.

Specific recommendations

The Government of Somaliland had wholeheartedly tried several times to form a national army, even though all these have not materialized due to the lack of resources, mainly food for those who attend the camps.

The Government hereby requests the following measures of assistance in order to ensure peace and stability:

1. Delivery of food for peace for the security forces and police.

2. Provision of an expert on demobilization to assist the army commanders in the process of demobilization.

3. That the United Nations assists the government in the project of demobilizing.

Yours sincerely,

Mohamed Abdi Dhinbiil (Galbeedi)
Minister of Planning and Development

/...

Annex III

A. Letter of agreement addressed by General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) to the United Nations on 29 March 1992

WHEREAS I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;

2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

Signed .....

Date 29/3/92 Place Djibouti

Witnessed by: Robert M Gallagher

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. Letter of 29 March 1992 from SSDF Chairman Mohamed Abshir Musse

SSDF position on peace and national reconciliation in Somalia

The SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SSDF) welcomes the current initiatives and mediation efforts of the international community, and particularly the United Nations, OAU, Arab League and OIC. The SSDF urges the United Nations and the three regional organizations to take more positive action including direct intervention in peace-keeping, political mediation and management.

The Somali civil war, one of the most murderous and destructive communal strifes in recent memory, has claimed over 100,000 lives; resulted in more than a million starving internal refugees and about 600,000 external refugees since January 1991; it fragmented the country into unviable rebel "republics" and regions; and it caused the total disintegration of all state institutions, infrastructure and socio-economic life of the Somali people. This disaster was brought about by the 21 years of misrule, corruption and clan promotion of Dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre's regime in Somalia.

The Somali crisis is more complex than the international community seems to appreciate. With all the goodwill and necessary dedications, the Somalis are unlikely to resolve the crisis soon by themselves alone. Many Somali national leaders took the initiative on various occasions in an effort to tackle the conflict or conflicts and to bring about peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

But all their efforts were sabotaged and frustrated by tens of thousands of fully armed bandits, ex-convicts/criminals, street-boys and renegade ex-Siyad Barre soldiers, whose business and livelihood is the gun and, who are for hire to the highest bidder, work as part-time mercenaries, for power-hungry military officers in all the regions of the country.

It is in consideration of the above and because of a deep knowledge of the culture, traditions and politics of the country as well as a realistic assessment of the impact of the civil war on the people and institutions that the SSDF reached the conclusions contained in this and the attached letters which have been submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Secretaries-General of the OAU, Arab League and OIC. Furthermore, we wish to reconfirm the SSDF position on peace, national reconciliation and relief provision in the following summary:

1. On national reconciliation

- SSDF strongly believes in peaceful solution to the crisis through dialogue and reconciliation.

- The SSDF calls for the convening of an all-embracing National Reconciliation Conference at the earliest possible date under the auspices of the United Nations and the three regional organizations as an essential step for the achievement of a lasting peaceful solution to the Somali problem.

- In view of the close similarity of the Somali crisis to that of Cambodia and the United Nations precedent there, we strongly recommend the United Nations to seriously consider the Cambodian solution as one of the most practical options for Somalia. The National Conference would, therefore, discuss, among other issues:

(a) The formation of a National Provisional Council;

(b) The restoration of law and order;

(c) Official request for a United Nations peace-keeping force and United Nations-managed Transitional Authority in the Cambodian model, and consistent with the sovereignty, cultural and religious values of the Somali nation; and

(d) An international appeal for relief and rehabilitation.

2. On peace and stability in Somalia and in the Horn

- SSDF supports the call for immediate cease-fire in Mogadishu and wherever else there is fighting in the country.

- SSDF urges the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Mogadishu and other current and potential trouble spots in the country. We consider such action as indispensable in the effective establishment of peace and stability in all the regions of Somalia by disarming the tribal, factional and renegade armed militias and bandits, and assisting in the formation of a national security police force.

- We believe the peace, stability and economy as well as successful relief activities of the nations of the Horn of Africa are very much interdependent. No one country or region can by itself achieve much progress in isolation of the others. SSDF wishes, therefore, to suggest to the international community to consider the practical benefits of a regional approach along the national, especially now when there is no enmity among the nations in the region.

3. On the fighting in Mogadishu and the national capital

- We are deeply concerned of the bloodshed and misery in the national capital, Mogadishu, resulting from the continued and destructive fighting there and urge the parties to the conflict to maintain the cease-fire and settle their differences through dialogue and in the wider framework of the national reconciliation process.

- However, the international community and the other national parties should bring combined pressure against any defiant and uncompromising party in Mogadishu and be made to bear the serious consequences.

- And if Mogadishu is to remain the national capital of Somalia, it must be accorded new demilitarized and national status free from any clan or tribal claims.

4. On emergency relief

- Following the total disruption, disintegration and massive displacement over all Somalia, millions of people are starving inside and outside refugee camps both inside and outside Somalia. Isolated areas in north-eastern, central and south-western regions suffer even more.

- We, as SSDF, are very concerned at recent worrying statements on relief for Somalia by the United Nations and other members of the international community to the effect that the supply of relief to the Somali people was to be conditional on cessation of hostilities in Mogadishu. This statement was unfortunate and unfair. The antagonists in Mogadishu do not represent all the people and all the regions of Somalia and the whole nation is not responsible for the actions of a couple of warlords.

- We appeal to the United Nations agencies, donor nations, NGOs and the international community as a whole to rush relief supplies for the starving and malnourished millions in Somalia on an emergency basis. We further urge that all future relief supplies BE DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY to all regions of the country, which has not been the case so far. Unbalanced and biased distribution of relief may cause unnecessary clan and regional antagonism and suspicion and could, consequently, complicate the search for peace and stability.

5. On rehabilitation and reconstruction

- In the event peace and order is hopefully restored in the near future, the more daunting task of rebuilding the totally destroyed and destitute nation remains to be tackled. Somalia does not have the necessary resources - financial or know-how - to rebuild.

- SSDF proposes, therefore, that the United Nations appoint an Administrator General, preferably a Muslim, to head a two-three-year Transitional Authority along the lines of Cambodia, to be appointed for Somalia.

- A Transitional Authority could also enhance Somali national unity as it would most likely encourage and save face for the people of "Somaliland" to rescind from their secession stand. They would see a United Nations Administrator General as neutral and impartial, also removing their main fear of "Southern Domination", particularly during the period of transition when emotion and suspicion is still high.

Yours faithfully,

SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT

Mohamed Abshir Musse
SSDF CHAIRMAN

ENCLOSURES:

1. Copy of a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General dated 20/01/92.
2. Copy of a letter to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, OAU, Arab League and OIC dated 10/03/92.

Annex IV

A. Letter of agreement addressed by General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, Chairman of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) to the United Nations on 31 March 1992

WHEREAS I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, Chairman SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;

2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of all regions equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

Signed.....

Date....31/3/92....Place....Kismayo.....
Witnessed by:....Robert M. Gallagher.....

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission
to Somalia including representatives of
the Organization of African Unity, the
League of Arab States and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. Letter of agreement addressed by 1. Bashir Omar Samater, Harti Geri-Meheri Representative, 2. Ahmed Mahamud Ato, Lelkase-Awrtable Representative, 3. Jama Sure, Marehan Representative, 4. Mohamud Ali Duh, Absame Representative, 5. Hagi Osman Hasan, Tunni Representative, to the United Nations on 31 March 1992

WHEREAS we, 1. Bashir Omar Samater, 2. Ahmed Mahamud Ato, 3. Jama Sure, 4. Mohamud Ali Duh, 5. Hagi Osman Hasan, are cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in our country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS we, Bashir Omar Samater, Ahmed Mahamud Ato, Jama Sure, Mohamud Ali Duh, Hagi Osman Hasan, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in our country and their efforts to assist our country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in our country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

We, Bashir Omar Samater: Harti Geri-Meheri Representative
Ahmed Mahamud Ato: Lelkase-Awrtable Representative
Jama Sure: Marehan Representative
Mohamud Ali Duh: Absame Representative
Hagi Osman Hasan: Tunni Representative do hereby agree to:

1. Commit ourselves to work for peace and stability in our country;

2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under our influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit ourselves to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of all regions equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of our country:

Signed...[signature]...

Date. 31/03/92.....Place...KISMAIO.....

Witnessed by:...Robert M. Gallagher.....

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission
to Somalia including representatives of
the Organization of African Unity, the
League of Arab States and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

Consolidated inter-agency 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia

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INTRODUCTION

1. The integrated Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, covering a 90-day period, sets out the modalities and inputs required for the accelerated and expanded delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance to people in all parts of Somalia. The Plan has been compiled within the context of resolution 746 (1992) which was adopted by the Security Council on 17 March 1992.

2. In that resolution, the Security Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch urgently to Somalia a United Nations technical team to prepare an operational plan for the monitoring of the cease-fire agreement between the two factions engaged in conflict at Mogadishu. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population.

3. In view of the severe security constraints on ongoing relief efforts in many parts of Somalia, the Secretary-General requested the Technical Team to look into possible mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need. To facilitate this action, the Technical Team included the Secretary-General's Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, two representatives from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and a representative from the non-governmental organization (NGO) community.

4. The Team, which was dispatched to Somalia from 23 March to 1 April 1992, visited Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargeisa and met with the authorities and clan leaders from north-east Somalia and from the south-west of the country. A report of the Team's findings has been submitted to the Secretary-General (S/23829). The present document describes the current situation in the areas visited and the agreements that were made with the various authorities and clan leaders for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through the collaborative efforts of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs.

5. The difficulties of providing relief assistance under prevailing conditions in many parts of Somalia are evident and the safety of relief personnel engaged in humanitarian assistance remains a paramount concern. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the crisis and its threat to the stability of other countries within the Horn of Africa, no time can be lost in mounting large-scale relief efforts. In this regard, the paradox facing the international community should be noted: without security, relief assistance will continue to be severely constrained, but without relief assistance programmes, the prospects for security are at best precarious.

6. In view of the situation, a pragmatic approach has been adopted in the determination of inputs for the 90-day Plan and modalities for the delivery of

assistance. Hence, while emergency relief requirements for the 90-day period have been based on needs assessments undertaken earlier in the year and incorporated into the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for the Horn of Africa of 1 February 1992, the Plan has also attempted to provide sufficient quantities of relief food to reduce the risk of further deterioration in the already volatile situation, as well as to promote the demobilization of large numbers of military personnel.

7. It must be recognized, however, that even with such an approach, the effectiveness of the 90-day Plan will be determined by the observance by all parties of the basic principles of international humanitarian assistance, including parity of relief distributions and safe passage for relief personnel and supplies through designated "corridors" and "zones of peace".

8. To date, there has been only limited financial support from donors for the Somalia portion of the Horn of Africa Appeal. Thus it should be noted that the prompt and generous support of the international community in providing sufficient funds for identified needs is essential. Given the fluidity of circumstances in Somalia, revised needs assessments, within the overall context of the 1 February 1992 Appeal, will need to be carried out during the course of the next three months. Thus the Plan should be seen as part of an ongoing process, which will continue to update needs in targeted areas and identify new needs as they emerge, as well as determine inputs required for longer-term programmes.

I. BACKGROUND

9. Four years of civil war, against a backdrop of years of neglect and lack of investment in human development, basic services and infrastructure, have left much of Somalia in ruins. Major cities in northern Somalia have been reduced to rubble; houses, public buildings, communications and water systems have been destroyed and an already inadequate health sector has been rendered incapable of providing even the most rudimentary services. Agricultural production and Somalia's vital livestock trade have been crippled and an entire generation of Somali children is growing up without access to education.

10. In the 14 months that have passed since the overthrow of the former President Siad Barre, the situation in many parts of Somalia has continued to deteriorate. There is no functioning Government and political instability prevails throughout the country. The struggle for power, which has resulted in inter-clan and intra-clan conflict, has plunged towns and cities into a nightmare of bloodshed and violence. The disruption that has been caused by prolonged conflict and insecurity has seriously affected normal commercial and foreign aid, including donated food supplies. Consequently, the lives of 1.5 million Somali people are at most immediate risk and 3.5 million more also require some form of relief assistance.

11. At Mogadishu, where intense fighting has continued between the two main factions of the United Somali Congress (USC) since November 1991, a cease-fire

agreement was signed in February 1992. The relative calm in the city, however, is fragile. Gangs of armed men and boys continue to prowl the streets, while other sub-clans and factions remain in control of key installations.

12. In the north, which enjoyed almost 12 months of relative stability in 1991, recent months have seen a worsening security situation and increased banditry. In the south, relief efforts are ongoing but intra-clan rivalry and looting of relief supplies has prevented the expansion of activities. Services are thus inadequate and cannot cope with current needs. In recent months there has been further internal displacement of people. Over 100,000 other Somalis have also crossed the border into Kenya as refugees, placing severe strains on already exhausted camp structures and food supplies.

13. In the midst of the chaos that prevails throughout many areas, ICRC and NGOs, with support from the United Nations, have continued to work alongside Somali doctors, nurses, indigenous NGOs and local United Nations staff to alleviate the plight of those most in need. Over the months, however, banditry and looting have become commonplace, resulting in the deaths of a number of local and expatriate relief staff and further disruption of relief efforts.

II. CURRENT SITUATION

A. Mogadishu

14. At Mogadishu, the recent upsurge in factional conflict between Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of USC (Hawiye clan), for control of the city and the breakdown of law and order have left over 25,000 people dead or wounded and an estimated 500,000 people totally devoid of even rudimentary services.

15. Following the intervention of the Secretary-General and the signing of a cease-fire agreement by the two parties, a joint mission comprising the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was dispatched to Somalia from 29 February to 3 March 1992. An agreement was reached with the two sides for a United Nations technical team to visit Mogadishu to work out modalities for monitoring the cease-fire.

16. Since that time, fighting has subsided and large numbers of people who had fled to the outskirts of the city have taken advantage of the break in hostilities to return to the capital to rebuild their homes. Water and food shortages, along with fuel supplies, however, are acute. In spite of significant amounts of non-food relief assistance, shelter, health care and sanitation services continue to be inadequate.

17. Although some food supplies have been brought into Mogadishu by traders, prices in the markets are high and beyond the means of most of the population. Relief food distributions have been halted since November 1991,

when the intense fighting between the two factions began. In January 1992, 7,000 metric tons of food from the World Food Programme (WFP) stored at the port of Mogadishu were looted. Attempts by WFP on 4 March 1992 to deliver food to the capital had to be aborted following an attack on the WFP vessel in Mogadishu harbour. As a result of continued food shortages, it is now estimated that some 700,000 people in Mogadishu are in need of urgent assistance. Of most concern are the displaced persons still living on the outskirts of the city, those who have recently returned to the capital and a further 80,000 representing highly vulnerable groups.

18. Although most of the diplomatic community evacuated the capital in 1991, seven international and indigenous NGOs are presently operating in Mogadishu. The International Medical Corps (IMC) is working in two hospitals in the south of the city and hopes to expand its activities to the north. Médecins sans frontières - France is involved in war-related surgery, the supply of essential drugs to the city's three main hospitals and to health centres. Save the Children Fund (SCF) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has established 12 maternal and child health (MCH) clinics, supplementary and therapeutic feeding services and is providing nurses to work in the hospitals.

19. SOS and Comitato Internazionale Sviuppo Populi (CISP), an Italian NGO, are also involved in the health care and feeding of malnourished groups, along with similar assistance provided by indigenous NGOs. ICRC is working closely with the Somali Red Crescent Society and focusing its activities on surgical and medical assistance for the wounded in hospitals on the north and south sides of the city. ICRC has also provided medical, surgical, pharmaceutical and other health-related supplies to hospitals and clinics.

20. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has provided coordination and logistics assistance for United Nations and NGO efforts at Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country through a project executed under the Obligations and Payments System. The total value of the indicative planning figure (IPF) project, which has provided aircraft, consultants and radio equipment, is US$ 3.6 million. Until the end of 1991, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) had supplied over US$ 10 million in cash and relief items, mainly to NGOs working in the capital. Since re-establishing its presence at Mogadishu in December 1991, UNICEF, using WFP aircraft on loan from the Sudan, airlifted 256 tons of emergency supplies for people in need on both sides of the city. Some fuel has also been supplied to hospitals in order to maintain essential medical services.

21. As part of the airlift operation, the airstrip in the north of the city was rehabilitated. A major breakthrough was achieved during the operation when UNICEF was able to transport supplies by road from the south to the north of the city for the first time since the conflict erupted. In recent weeks, UNICEF has also established six MCH centres in the capital, with plans to extend such services to areas presently uncovered. In the past three months, the World Health Organization (WHO) has supplied emergency health, surgery and laboratory kits, along with essential drugs and medical supplies to support NGO programmes.

B. Central Somalia

22. Owing to conflict and insecurity, around 120,000 people have fled from Mogadishu and are living in precarious conditions around the small coastal port of Merca, south of the capital. Although the needs of the area are urgent, delivery of relief food assistance has been extremely difficult owing to disruptions caused by armed gangs from Mogadishu. Apart from an indigenous NGO, the Committee Against Hunger, which has established a feeding unit for an estimated 1,000 children and about 300 adults, no other NGOs are currently working in the Merca area.

23. The region of Belet Uen, which lies between the riverine environment of the Shabelle river and the drier regions to the north, is also a major cause for concern. The return over the last year of many thousands of people has placed severe strains on food supplies and the nutritional condition of large numbers of people is extremely poor. Because of not being able to use the port of Mogadishu, ICRC has recently started an airlift of food supplies to alleviate the plight of people in the area. The combined total of people in need of food assistance in the region, including Merca, is estimated to be 500,000.

C. North-west Somalia

24. The north-west suffered greatly in the civil war. Its main city, Hargeisa, once home to over 500,000 people, was abandoned by the population, most of them fleeing to refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Although many of these people have now returned, some 85 per cent of homes and public buildings in the city were destroyed during aerial and ground bombardment and are no longer habitable. Health care services, water systems, schools and sanitation services, as well as communication and banking systems, were virtually wiped out throughout the region. In addition, hundreds of thousands of mines were laid, particularly in and around Hargeisa and Burao. Along with the vast amounts of unexploded ordnance, they remain a major risk to the lives of both Somalis and relief workers.

25. In many areas of the north, the September-October Dayir (short rains) failed, seriously affecting pasture and water availability. Consequently, there has been unusually high mortality of livestock. This has been exacerbated by the spread of diseases owing to the almost complete lack of veterinary care over the last four years. The loss and poor condition of animals threaten the future of a substantial portion of the population. In addition, there was little crop cultivation in 1991 and what was planted largely failed owing to the drought.

26. Although the area saw relative peace for almost a year following the overthrow of Siad Barre, in recent months conditions have seriously deteriorated owing to intra-clan conflict and a subsequent breakdown of law and order. The Government formed by the Somali National Movement (SNM) after its declaration of independence barely controls Hargeisa. Earlier attempts to

start demobilizing the army that fought in the civil war have also been interrupted and the armies of the opposing factions are reported to be poised for battle. In January 1992, intra-clan conflict spilled over to Burao, resulting in the displacement of large numbers of people.

27. The return of peace to the region in 1991 led to a relatively large number of NGOs re-establishing their programmes in various areas. SCF (United Kingdom) opened three MCH centres and monetized 2,500 tons of food through market traders, as well as providing seeds and tools. The agency also carried out an important nutritional survey of seven of the major cities in the north and a socio-economic assessment of the rural areas in late 1991. Médecins sans frontières (MSF) of the Netherlands has opened five MCH centres and is assisting two hospitals - one at Burao and one at Sheik - as well as a therapeutic feeding centre.

28. Oxfam (United Kingdom) has undertaken emergency water rehabilitation programmes at Hargeisa and other towns in the north and has assisted in the management of water tankers at Hargeisa. Partner Aid International, working mainly in the Sanaag region, has been involved in agricultural rehabilitation, including the supply of vegetable seeds, pest and disease control and gravity-fed irrigation systems. Handicap International, based at Hargeisa, has provided prosthesis assistance. Other NGOs working in the north-west include Help the Aged International, German Emergency Doctors, Action Aid, COPI (an Italian NGO) and Hands.

29. ICRC has been running a hospital at Berbera, catering mainly to victims of the war, and has provided drugs for other hospitals and veterinary supplies. The running of the hospital was recently handed over to the Somali Red Crescent Society, with assistance from the Norwegian Red Cross. Some food rations have also been provided by ICRC for vulnerable groups.

30. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has maintained a presence in Hargeisa from October 1991 to prepare for its planned repatriation programme for 300,000 returnees from refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia. Although large numbers of people have already returned spontaneously from these camps, the official repatriation programme has had to be put on hold owing to prevailing security conditions. Preparatory activities have continued, however, with the pre-positioning of food and non-food items in Djibouti for transshipment to north-west Somalia at the appropriate time. To facilitate the return of refugees, UNHCR has supported NGOs in the region with supplies for MCH centres and hospitals. In 1991 UNHCR provided US$ 500,000 for the funding of accelerated demining efforts, with an additional US$ 2.8 million for demining activities anticipated in 1992. This is in support of an earlier programme financed by the Government of the United States of America and the European Community (EC) and implemented by MSF (Netherlands). UNDP also plans, with bilateral cost-sharing, to assist with the expansion of demining activities in 1992.

31. UNICEF has been active in the north-west since May 1991, mainly in the health, water, sanitation and nutrition sectors. UNICEF has rehabilitated

water systems at Hargeisa and Berbera and has carried out immunization programmes, in addition to providing support to international and indigenous NGOs in the rehabilitation of basic health services, including MCH centres. Maternity and paediatric wards of six hospitals have also been assisted. WHO has provided emergency health, surgical and laboratory kits, essential drugs and supplementary feeding materials to hospitals, NGOs and for local health authorities. Health education and training materials were also supplied by WHO to MSF (Netherlands) and SCF (United Kingdom) for the School of Nursing at Hargeisa.

32. WFP, through Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), has provided food for a monetization programme aimed at making food available at affordable prices and generating cash for rehabilitation projects. Some 6,000 tons out of a proposed 15,000 tons of food assistance for the WFP programme was delivered in 1991. Of this total, 4,500 tons was successfully monetized. The remaining food stocks, however, along with the proceeds of the monetization programme, were looted in February 1992. Following threats to its staff, CARE recently withdrew from the region. In addition, at the end of 1991, 2,518 tons of food was provided by WFP to UNICEF for vulnerable group feeding. Less than 400 tons of these supplies were able to be distributed. The rest was stolen in the escalating incidents of banditry. Between January and March 1992, large numbers of relief vehicles were stolen; houses and compounds of United Nations and NGOs attacked and looted and warehouses robbed of food aid, medical supplies and water equipment.

D. North-east Somalia

33. The north-east region from the port of Bosaso down to the central region, as far as Galcaio, is largely controlled by the Darod/Majerteyn clan. Although the security situation throughout most parts of the north-east has been relatively stable, clashes have occurred in areas south of Galcaio between the controlling north-east party, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and USC. The port of Bosaso, however, has remained active for commercial traffic, with reported off-take of up to 20 trucks a day ferrying supplies to central Somalia, the Ogaden regions of Ethiopia and as far as Mogadishu.

34. Following scant rains in 1991, the area is experiencing severe drought and pasture-land is depleted. This has had serious repercussions on an economy highly dependent on livestock. Owing to poor livestock health and lack of veterinary services, export markets have been lost and there has been a significant drop in the value of animals. In addition, over the course of the past year, hundreds of thousands of Majerteyn clan members have returned to their homeland from other parts of Somalia, particularly from Mogadishu and the south. The displaced persons are placing a heavy burden on an already destitute community. To date, little relief assistance has been delivered to the north-east. Although there was considerable interest in assisting the region in late 1991, UNICEF, WFP/CARE and NGO plans to begin food aid and non-food assistance were halted, following the murder of a UNICEF doctor at Bosaso. Two other relief workers were wounded in the attack.

E. South-east Somalia

35. The region of Kismayo and Gelib encompasses both the town of Kismayo and the lower part of the Jubba valley. The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), mainly Darod clan, claims control of the vast areas from the north (Brava, 75 kilometers from Mogadishu and 300 kilometres from Kismayo), south and west to the Kenya (Liboi) border. However, three separate factions - SSDF, the Somali National Front (SNF) and the United Somali Party (USP) - occupy various areas of the region. No one single party has total control over either the region or Kismayo and there has been intermittent conflict and tension.

36. Although towns and villages were not significantly damaged during the civil war, mass displacements of people have occurred both into and out of the region. While factional fighting resulted in large-scale population movements out of Kismayo, the population of Kismayo itself has increased from an estimated 50,000 people in 1990 to around 200,000 owing to influxes of displaced, mostly from Mogadishu. Make-shift shelters housing the displaced are scattered throughout the town and on its outskirts.

37. The consequences of mass movements of populations, together with conflict and disruption to agricultural activities, have been catastrophic. The resources of villages and small towns have been exhausted and severe malnutrition is reported in several areas. In some clinics at Kismayo, 80 per cent of the children seen were malnourished - over a third suffering from severe malnutrition. In addition to Somalis, approximately 250,000 people of Bantu origin, without any affiliation to the Somali clans, are also located in the region and are in urgent need of food aid assistance.

38. The health of large numbers of people throughout the region remains a serious concern. Many deaths from malaria, dysentery and tuberculosis have already occurred. Owing to insecurity and banditry, few relief agencies have re-established programmes in the area. Apart from ICRC and some indigenous NGOs, only World Concern, MSF (Belgium) and UNICEF are working at Kismayo and it has not been possible to reach most of the rural areas. World Concern began implementing an emergency health programme in December 1991 and has established two MCHs and seven medical clinics in key locations along the Jubba river and operates a mobile medical dispensary. MSF (Belgium) has established a surgical unit at Kismayo and is planning to extend its operations to Merca. Peace Aid Somalia, a local NGO, runs four camps for the displaced at Kismayo, providing assistance to over 3,000 people. Two other camps, run by the Somali Women's Concern, are assisting 2,000 people.

39. UNICEF has been working at Kismayo since December 1991 and is providing support to ongoing programmes, including those run by indigenous NGOs. In addition to medical supplies for the Kismayo hospital and shelter materials for the displaced, UNICEF has also provided UNIMIX (a high-protein cereal blend) for supplementary feeding programmes through regular airlifts into the city. WHO has provided UNIMIX and emergency health kits in Kismayo for NGO and ICRC programmes.

40. ICRC has been operating at Kismayo since early 1991. In addition to assisting the Somali Red Crescent Society to operate an MCH clinic and an Outpatients Department at the Kismayo hospital, ICRC has been the only agency to deliver food supplies to the region in recent months. Other relief services provided by ICRC include treatment of the war-wounded, sanitation activities, seeds and drug supply. Some 10 tons of seeds have already been supplied along the south coast and a further 90 tons will be delivered along the coastal areas over the next two months. Fishing lines and hooks are also being delivered to 50,000 families along the Jubba River and the Somali coast.

41. North of Kismayo, the enclave of Brava along the coast is essentially cut off from both Mogadishu and Kismayo. The area was severely affected by fighting throughout 1991 and the population is barely surviving on fishing and a very expensive local market. Malnutrition is reported to be severe.

F. South-west Somalia

42. Owing to conflict and intra- and inter-clan tensions, large numbers of people have fled to the Liboi/Doble region on the borders of Kenya. Although many have crossed into Kenya as refugees, up to 200,000 people still remain in makeshift shelters along the border areas. ICRC has begun a cross-border feeding operation from Kenya, but given the pressures on refugee camps in Kenya and the need to stanch the refugee flow, the situation remains a major concern. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which recently fielded a mission to the area, reports that water holes have dried up owing to drought and that cattle are dying. To support ICRC activities in the Liboi area, WHO has supplied ICRC with emergency health kits.

43. The Gedo and Bay areas have been recently visited by ICRC for the first time and a basic assessment has taken place. The area is under the control of the former Head of State, Siad Barre, and there are political complications in terms of access. Of particular concern, however, is the plight of some 20,000 Ethiopian refugees who have remained in the area and are reported by ICRC to be in extremely poor condition.

III. MODALITIES FOR ASSISTANCE

44. It is now estimated that the lives of 1.5 million people in various parts of the country are seriously threatened by lack of access to food and health care provision. A further 3.5 million Somalis are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. As the need for urgent action increases daily, however, deteriorating security conditions throughout many parts of the country continue to be a major impediment to the delivery and expansion of relief assistance.

45. The high value of food commodities has made the delivery of food aid to people in need particularly problematic and dangerous. Food aid shipments have been attacked and prevented from being discharged at ports; warehouses

have been looted and food aid supplies hijacked by armed gangs or at the instigation of local authorities. In the process of trying to deliver food supplies to those in urgent need, a number of relief workers have been killed and injured. In view of the risks involved, expatriate relief staff have been reduced to a minimum and most relief organizations are no longer prepared to handle food aid assistance.

46. In spite of these severe constraints, the humanitarian crisis facing the people of Somali must be rapidly addressed and opportunities found to provide assistance to affected groups. As already evidenced by the flow of refugees from Somalia into Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, the crisis has regional consequences and there are grave concerns about the effects such population movements will have on the Horn of Africa. Measures to encourage Somalis who also might seek refuge in neighbouring countries to stay in their homeland need to be explored as a matter of urgency.

47. Special attention is also needed to address the plight of Somali women who, despite their role as family providers and sources of family stability, have become increasingly exposed to rape and violence. In addition, with the onset of the rainy season in mid-May, the need to accelerate relief efforts to avoid further serious health hazards and spread of communicable diseases amongst an already weakened population is of paramount importance.

48. The safety of relief workers engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance in the midst of a complete collapse of law and order and continuing conflict remains a major concern. The 90-day Plan thus relies heavily on the recommendations of the Technical Team and has assumed that security measures, including United Nations security personnel, will be quickly put in place to protect relief workers and relief supplies. It also assumes that agreements reached with the various authorities, factions and clan leaders on facilitating relief assistance will be upheld and that the major ports in the country will be accessible. Furthermore, it must be accepted that designated "corridors" and "zones of peace" must be maintained. These zones include ports, airports and areas in which United Nations and NGO activities are under way.

49. Even with such measures and agreements in place, conditions prevailing in Somalia still call for a pragmatic approach. Conventional mechanisms for the delivery of relief assistance no longer exist and in the absence of government structures, maximum use will have to be made of existing local structures and organizations. Traders, who thus far have been able to continue to bring in commercial food supplies, will also be used to deliver food to various parts of the country.

50. The Plan attempts to address the problems of Somalia on a nation-wide basis to reduce the risk of further deterioration in already volatile conditions and to avoid further large-scale population movements in search of food. Distribution of food supplies, in particular, will be carried out simultaneously in as many areas as possible to lessen the risk of disruptions at distribution sites.

51. Owing to factors already outlined in the present document, ICRC is currently the only relief agency involved in food aid delivery. Modalities used by ICRC to deliver and distribute food rely mainly on the involvement of the traditional clan elders and chiefs, who under the ICRC programme assume responsibility for the collection, transport and distribution of food supplies. In some areas, however, including Mogadishu, clan structures are now either no longer functioning, or have varying degrees of effectiveness. This has meant that other mechanisms to enable food to reach people in need have had to be considered.

52. Within the context of the 90-day Plan, ICRC will collaborate with the United Nations to enable the immediate acceleration and expansion of food assistance. In Mogadishu, both ICRC and WFP, through its implementing partner, CARE International, have agreed to share responsibility for the delivery of food aid assistance. ICRC will continue its ongoing programmes along the coast, including to Kismayo, as well as to Belet Uen and the cross-border operation from Kenya. WFP will provide food for the north-west and north-east Somalia. In addition to food rations for vulnerable groups and displaced persons, supplementary food assistance will be provided for 180,000 people and a further 100,000 soldiers will be targeted for assistance under special demobilization programmes in Mogadishu and the north-west of Somalia.

53. Livestock remain central to the economy of the Somali people and of critical importance is the need to re-establish the livestock trade. Towards this end, quarantine centres in all of the major trading ports are required to enable disease-free animals to be sold at optimum market rates. The success of such centres will depend upon full-scale vaccination campaigns. Some 3,500 tons of seeds will also be required to enable people to resume agricultural production. Although commitments for vegetable seeds appear to cover needs in areas in the north-west of the country, funds are urgently needed to enable the purchase and delivery of cereal seeds.

54. As regards the health sector, even prior to the civil war, Somalia had some of the lowest social and economic indices in the world, characterized by low levels of development, high infant and maternal mortality rates and high levels of dependency upon food aid. The present crisis has exacerbated an already dire situation. In the light of the dramatic movements of people throughout the country and the impact on areas not normally covered by relief efforts, a major thrust of the 90-day Plan will be to expand non-food assistance to previously unserved areas, such as the south-west and central regions.

55. Of the estimated 70 hospitals functioning in Somalia in 1988, only 15 remain operational and these for the most part are totally dependent on external assistance and are predominantly curative in nature. Most have no water, electricity, drugs or even basic medical equipment. Malaria, tuberculosis and vaccination programmes have collapsed, along with the primary health care structure. The most immediate need thus entails the provision of a basic minimum of essential medical supplies as well as materials for the repair and rehabilitation of hospitals and MCH clinics. Salaries and food supplies will be required as incentives to encourage health personnel to

return to work. Throughout the country, there is also an urgent need to facilitate the resumption of a semblance of family life amongst those who have been displaced in the crisis through the supply of shelter materials, clothing and household items.

56. Although some major water rehabilitation programmes have been completed, ongoing projects have had to be suspended owing to insecurity and looting of supplies. In addition, some rural areas have experienced a two-year drought. Fuel, pumps, piping and technical assistance are required to enable water programmes to continue and new projects to be undertaken. Priority must be given to the provision of water supplies to health facilities and in displaced camp settlements. In areas with no existing water sources, it will be necessary to truck water and provide storage tanks, household water containers and fuel. The sanitation situation is also extremely serious throughout the country. Contamination of water sources by human excreta, animal carcasses and refuse poses a major public health threat. Shovels, pickaxes and other supplies will also be required for major clean-up campaigns under the 90-day Plan.

57. Under the present circumstances and given the plethora of authorities that exist in each of the targeted regions, it has become impractical to treat Somalia as one entity. The differing conditions, political and security environment of each of the regions have dictated that specific modalities for the delivery of humanitarian assistance be designed according to the prevailing situation in each of the regions. The followirg sections provide details of inputs required and modalities for delivery of assistance in the six regions targeted under the 90-day Plan.

A. Mogadishu

58. While the present security situation at Mogadishu remains precarious and the cease-fire extremely fragile, the needs of over 700,000 displaced persons and other vulnerable groups in the capital make the provision of humanitarian assistance of paramount importance.

59. To facilitate the resumption of large-scale humanitarian assistance, it was agreed by both USC factions that the port of Mogadishu would be reopened to enable sufficient relief supplies to reach the capital. Both sides have agreed to ensure efficient and equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of the city under their influence and that the port, airports, hospitals, NGO locations and routes to and from food and non-food distribution points will be declared "corridors and zones of peace".

60. The two parties also agreed to the deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect United Nations and NGO relief personnel and to the formation of a Joint Relief Committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations. The Committee will be chaired by the United Nations and will meet on United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.

61. Even with these agreements in place, recent experience has shown that owing to the nature of the shifting and loose coalitions that have been formed by both sides with their forces and the need to factor in other neutral sub-clans and factions, the delivery of relief assistance and in particular food aid is likely to continue to be extremely difficult. Efforts are thus continuing to identify leaders from other sub-clans and factions in Mogadishu in order to enlist their cooperation in the delivery of assistance through the 90-day Plan. The large number of armed gangs that are not controlled by either side and the lack of affordable food in the city also pose very serious problems. Currently, all NGOs, ICRC, Somali Red Crescent Society and the United Nations have to employ large numbers of armed guards to protect their personnel and relief supplies.

62. In view of these factors and based on the recommendations of the Technical Team, United Nations security personnel will be needed for the port and to enable the safe passage of relief personnel and humanitarian supplies through agreed "corridors" and "zones of peace".

63. WFP and ICRC will take responsibility for shipments of food supplies to the port of Mogadishu. As regards WFP food, an initial allocation will arrive at the port as soon as appropriate arrangements for the receipt of the food, storage, handling and distribution are in place. WFP and CARE, in consultation with the Joint Relief Committee, will designate amounts of food for onward transport and delivery to beneficiaries. Food deliveries to the port will be consigned to WFP. CARE will arrange storage and transportation from the port through local transport contracts under the auspices of monitors provided by the Joint Relief Committee.

64. At the district level, local relief committees composed of clan elders, religious leaders and local security personnel will undertake food distribution to the predetermined beneficiaries. Distribution of supplies will be undertaken in the displaced camps by the Health Committees that have already been established. Until such a time that a detailed assessment of needs can be carried out, an interim apportionment of food aid will be made to each USC faction. It is anticipated that the WFP/CARE free food distribution programme will be used by the authorities to undertake demobilization activities and to enhance security arrangements. Precise modalities for this programme still need to be formulated and agreed.

65. An estimated 80,000 children will receive supplementary rations, either dry, take-home commodities or wet feeding at MCH centres. A number of additional therapeutic feeding units will need to be established for the severely malnourished.

66. If the security situation in and around Mogadishu is adequate and "zones of peace" are respected, UNICEF, WHO and NGOs will also seek to expand their provision of primary health care, water and communicable disease control programmes, as well as programmes for supplying essential drugs and rehabilitating hospitals. UNICEF will re-establish the municipal water supply system at Mogadishu and NGOs, ICRC and UNICEF will continue their efforts to

provide adequate water facilities to displaced camps in and around the city. Given the scarcity of adequate water supplies, some water tankers are needed immediately. Shelter materials also remain priority items since the rains have already begun to fall and many people are still without basic shelter.

67. To reduce costs as much as possible, maximum use will be made of sea and road transport. The port at Mogadishu is technically sound and five of the six berths are open and access routes from the port are in good condition. There is, however, a severe problem with fuel supplies since the looting and subsequent fire in the fuel depot. Relief shipments into Mogadishu will need to be accompanied with sufficient fuel stocks for onward forwarding. It is assumed that based on arrangements made for use of Mogadishu port, "corridors" and "zones of peace" can be extended so that the port can be used to serve Merca, Baidoba, Belet Uen and Galcaio.

68. In the 90-day Plan, a substantial and carefully coordinated airlifting and air passenger operation will be required to deliver drugs, medical supplies and supplementary foods to both the north and south of the city, as well as to facilitate the movement of relief personnel. Currently, the traditional Mogadishu international airport in the southern part of the city in the area controlled by General Aidid and an airstrip 12 kilometres north of the city in the Mahdi section are used for the delivery of relief supplies.

B. Central Somalia

69. ICRC will continue to provide assistance to the displaced and other highly vulnerable groups situated around the coastal ports of Merca, Adele and Obbia. Distribution of supplies will be undertaken by the clan elders and chiefs. UNICEF will complement the efforts of ICRC by providing medical supplies to health facilities and equipment such as weight-for-height charts, health education materials and, in conjunction with WFP, food items for supplementary feeding, fuel and operating resources.

70. At the same time, ICRC, along with international NGOs, will provide assistance to the displaced persons in Belet Uen. Until the port of Mogadishu can be used, ICRC intends to airlift approximately 2,000 tons of food aid per month into the area. Three international NGOs will support ICRC food activities through the provision of primary health care assistance and medical services, including the supply of medicines and essential drugs.

C. North-west Somalia

71. The threat of renewed conflict in the region has already led to a breakdown of law and order in the north-west and has caused serious disruptions to ongoing relief activities. In recent days, further deterioration in the situation and an unprecedented increase in the level of armed robberies and looting of relief warehouses and compounds have resulted in the withdrawal of most NGO and United Nations staff.

72. Although recent surveys indicated that nutritional levels have not yet reached emergency levels, food aid is nevertheless urgently required for vulnerable groups and to reduce tensions in the region and to promote stability. There is also the need to provide food and other assistance for the thousands of Somalis who have spontaneously returned from refugee camps in Ethiopia and for those who have yet to return under the planned UNHCR repatriation programme.

73. Agreements were reached by the United Nations Technical Team with the authorities at Hargeisa and with clan chiefs and elders for the urgent resumption of relief assistance, including food aid. Thus, assuming considerable improvement in the security situation, the 90-day Plan will aim to address four critical areas: food and non-food assistance to highly vulnerable groups, with particular emphasis on the displaced; assistance for promoting demobilization; community-based assistance to returnee impacted areas and emergency income-generation activities. It should be noted, however, that as with other areas, implementation of activities proposed in the Plan will be dependent upon agreements reached with the Technical Team being upheld, including the safe passage of all relief workers and supplies and the ability to expand current activities.

74. Based upon this premise, WFP will provide, through the port of Berbera, food assistance to the government authorities to support a military demobilization programme. WFP will also supply additional quantities of food to assist institutional stabilization and rehabilitation measures. One option for delivery of food supplies is through off-shore market sales schemes, but the modalities for such schemes are still being explored.

75. Therapeutic feeding will be needed through hospitals for the most severely malnourished. Supplementary feeding will also be undertaken and expanded to presently uncovered areas of the north-west, if required. To facilitate the UNHCR repatriation programme and to alleviate the pressure on areas impacted by people who have spontaneously returned from refugee camps in Somalia, emphasis must be given as quickly as possible to income-generating opportunities and to the rehabilitation of agriculture. Towards this end, FAO and ICRC are providing seeds, tools and pesticides through NGOs, in addition to what will be provided through the international NGOs themselves.

76. Livestock vaccination programmes also need to be resumed, along with rapid distribution of basic veterinary drugs. In order to protect livestock production from further losses, there is an urgent need to rehabilitate rural water points. The acceleration of demining activities is also of critical importance. Particularly affected areas are Hargeisa city and the areas south-west of Hargeisa and east and south of Burao towards the Ethiopian border. UNDP, in close collaboration with UNHCR, intends to intensify demining activities in the Hargeisa area; further assistance is required for other areas. UNHCR will also continue pre-positioning supplies in Djibouti in preparation for a full-scale repatriation programme.

77. In spite of the efforts of NGOs, UNICEF, WHO and UNHCR, the level of health services available to people in the north-west remains inadequate. Mortality rates are very high, especially among children and women. Many of these deaths could be avoided through immunization programmes. There is also a very serious problem in communicable diseases, in particular tuberculosis. Under the 90-day Plan, UNICEF will provide drugs and essential supplies to the MCHs and expanded programme on immunization (EPI) activities will be strengthened. Training of health staff in EPI activities is planned. In the same areas where therapeutic feeding centres are established, or already exist, nutritional surveillance units will be created at regional level and training provided to health staff for monitoring purposes. Again assuming that security is stable, WHO will undertake to develop a training programme in communicable disease control. In order to reduce the risk of losses and demotivation of staff, payments for local health workers are needed.

78. Drought has also caused serious water shortages, particularly in the east of the region and again, if security permits, the rapid expansion of water programmes should be undertaken within the framework of the 90-day Plan. The ongoing rehabilitation of the Sheik water supply system could be completed in the next three months, with works directly undertaken by UNICEF. Additionally the urban water systems of Burao and Las Anod could also be completed by Oxfam with funds provided by UNHCR and UNICEF. The recently started urban sanitation programme in Hargeisa should also be reactivated and similar projects initiated in other towns for garbage collection and waste disposal.

79. Fuel stocks to run water supply systems and for hospitals will be needed for the next three months. In view of the fact that a whole generation of Somalis is growing up without education, UNICEF, UNDP and NGOs also intend to undertake activities to establish urgently needed educational facilities and programmes.

80. The main port of entry to north-west Somalia is Berbera and there are large numbers of private and public warehouses in the town. However, other ports can be considered. Zeila port, for example, could be used for the transport of supplies to the Adwal area. In the Sannag region, Mait port can be used for the transport of supplies to the Erigavo area and Las Qorey port for the transport of supplies to the Badhan district. A smaller port, Hys, could be used for transport of supplies to El-Afweyn. It may also be possible to secure agreements with the authorities in the north-east for the routing of supplies for Las Anod and Sool through the port of Bosaso.

81. The best airstrip in the north-west is at Berbera, which is capable of handling all types of aircraft. The airstrip at Hargeisa can handle Hercules, Antonov and other large cargo carriers. Small aircraft can be flown into Boroma, Burao, Las Anod, Erigavo, Sheik and Odweyne. Roads in the north-west are generally good, particularly the main trunk road from Berbera to Las Anod via Sheik and Burao. Security, however, remains a major problem along most of the routes.

D. North-east Somalia

82. The security situation in the north-east has not allowed for a recent assessment of needs. However, it is evident that the mainstay of the economy is livestock production for export. Following conflict and drought, the livestock sector has been severely disrupted and, owing to lack of veterinary services, export of animals has been substantially reduced. In needs assessments undertaken in 1991, veterinary programmes, water supplies and health care provision were amongst activities most urgently needed. To address this problem, ICRC intends to provide immediate veterinary assistance to the area, including the rehabilitation by ICRC of the quarantine centre at the port of Bosaso.

83. Following the murder of the UNICEF doctor at Bosaso in early January 1992 and the public threats to all relief personnel, there have been very few visits to the area. Information from the region, however, indicates that between 300,000 and 500,000 displaced persons located between Bosaso and Gardo are in need of assistance. Following an inter-agency/NGO assessment of the region, WFP will seek to supply food under the 90-day Plan for offshore market sales schemes to provide resources for the rehabilitation of the social infrastructure. During the proposed needs assessments, arrangements will also be explored with local authorities for the use of the port of Bosaso to serve as a main logistical base for supplying large parts of central and northern Somalia. Bosaso is currently capable of handling ships of up to several thousand tons.

E. South-east Somalia

84. Within the framework of the 90-day Plan, ICRC will continue to supply food to the region. Given the increasing number of displaced persons at Brava and Kismayo, ICRC intends to provide up to 5,000 tons of food supplies monthly through free delivery. In the past, owing to the constant wrangling and negotiations between the clans and looting, the execution of food relief programmes has been problematic. While not totally satisfactory, the problems in food distribution have been partially solved through arrangements with ICRC that the clan elders and chiefs are responsible for the collection, transport and delivery of food aid supplies to their people.

85. Based on these arrangements, ICRC recently delivered 2,000 tons of food to Kismayo and both delivery and distribution is reported to have gone relatively smoothly. ICRC will thus continue using this system for delivery and distribution of future supplies. Food aid will be brought in through the port of Kismayo. The port functions well and has the capacity to handle the required tonnage.

86. From available information, malnutrition is widespread in the region. Food shortages, however, are most severe in the riverine villages, where looting of food and money by occupying forces has caused most families to resort to eating "famine foods", such as wild edible plants and green

mangoes. All villages south of Fanoole have lost most of their grain reserves. At Kismayo, some food is available in the markets but is priced beyond the means of much of the population. Evidence suggests that until food supply levels significantly improve, the health of vulnerable groups will remain at grave risk and looting of food and other supplies will continue.

87. In order to help address the food shortage problems and supplement rations provided by ICRC, UNICEF and WHO will work closely with the traditional communities and authorities to target assistance at the vulnerable groups and the displaced. Supplementary feeding programmes, health care services and the provision of shelter items and water supplies will be expanded. A priority objective will be to organize the estimated 30,000 displaced persons at Kismayo into manageable camps and provide them with adequate shelter, sanitation, water and basic medical and nutritional assistance. An additional 390 tons of food supplies will be needed per month for these 30,000 people.

88. UNICEF will strengthen its presence at Kismayo and collaborate closely with all international and local NGOs to ensure coordination of efforts. As part of its emergency plan, UNICEF intends to establish at least two more MCH centres at Kismayo and one in each accessible town in the region, as well as to expand the provision of medical supplies and equipment to 15 MCH centres in selected districts. As security permits, World Concern will also open up 22 more rural clinics.

89. Given the severe disruption to agricultural activities and the loss of seeds and livestock in the region, UNICEF will collaborate with ICRC and FAO to provide veterinary supplies, seeds, farming equipment.

90. A major constraint to effective delivery of humanitarian assistance is the shortage of human resources. Although, for example, there are many nurses in the region, most are displaced from Mogadishu and their training and technical experience varies. Under the Plan, UNICEF will undertake to organize refresher and in-service training to local health workers so that they can be mobilized to staff the expanded health care programme envisaged under the Plan. There are also a number of indigenous NGOs, such as Peace Aid Somalia and Somali Women's Concern, that are running camps for displaced persons. These NGOs will be supported by UNICEF to extend their programmes. Other international NGOs will be encouraged and supported to establish programmes in the region, including the extension of health services to Brava.

91. To facilitate the 90-day Plan, the Technical Team discussed the provision of humanitarian assistance with the respective leadership of each of the sub-clans at Kismayo and a number of agreements were reached. These were the guaranteed safe movement of international and local personnel working within and outside Kismayo, free and safe passage for all relief supplies and arrangements pertaining to use of Kismayo port.

92. In addition to the Somalis in need in the region, approximately 250,000 people of Bantu origin - without any affiliation to the Somali clans - are reported to be suffering from severe rates of malnutrition. The needs of this group will be one for priority assessment and response.

F. South-west Somalia

93. Grave problems appear to be developing along the Somali side of the Somali-Kenyan border, where an estimated 200,000 people have gathered, poised to cross into Kenya. ICRC is currently the only relief organization assisting these areas through cross-border programmes and it is clear that a major emergency could develop. An inter-agency/NGO assessment mission will be dispatched as quickly as possible to determine the extent of the needs. In the interim, ICRC will continue its food supply programme to the region.

94. Access to the area is best achieved by road through Kenya, but during the rains these roads will be impassible and alternative transport arrangements, such as airlifting, will be required. CRS is currently considering supporting the ICRC programme in at least two of the four ICRC cross-border points (Liboi-Doble and El Wak). Some agricultural inputs may also be provided under the CRS programme.

IV. COORDINATION MECHANISMS

95. The present Plan of Action has attempted to establish modalities that will facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Somalia. However, given prevailing conditions and limited financial and staff resources, it should be clear from the outset that prevention of a high death-toll in Somalia from lack of food and basic services, such as health care, water and sanitation, can only succeed through a carefully coordinated and collaborative effort on the part of the local leadership, clan elders, the international community, ICRC, NGOs and the United Nations system.

96. In addition, given prevailing conditions in many parts of Somalia, the political initiatives which have led to the current cease-fire agreement at Mogadishu must be continued and expanded to other areas of Somalia. "Corridors of peace" for the safe passage of relief workers and supplies and "zones of peace" to enable target groups to receive assistance are of paramount importance.

97. To enable effective coordination of efforts and to ensure that maximum use is made of resources, the Secretary-General has appointed a Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia. Key to the 90-day Plan is the recognized coordinating role of the United Nations and the increased and active presence of United Nations agencies in Somalia. To facilitate coordination and collaborative efforts, the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance will be based at Mogadishu, as well as maintaining close links with NGOs and donors located in both Nairobi and Djibouti.

98. To support the important work of the national and international NGOs and to ensure that there is close cooperation amongst all partners involved in the implementation of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia will undertake to hold regular meetings with all members of the NGO community, ICRC and donors who

are actively involved in relief efforts in the country. The United Nations will encourage local authorities to establish effective mechanisms that will facilitate the work of all relief personnel, including NGOs, and will also assist NGOs through the provision of difficult-to-deliver supplies, including fuel. While currently there is no provision for umbrella security arrangements for all relief personnel in Somalia, further discussion on the matter is urgently needed. Given the security constraints in Somalia, as well as in a number of other countries experiencing complex emergencies, the need to explore such arrangements should be brought to the attention of the Security Council as quickly as possible.

99. UNDP is providing direct support to the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in the form of staff, office accommodation, administrative and logistical back-stopping, including the revision of an existing project that will provide two light aircraft, a communications network and demining activities, hopefully with bilateral co-financing. Staff in the Coordinator's office will be responsible for receiving and disseminating information to the NGO and donor community. Field officers, reporting to the Coordinator, will be posted in offices at Hargeisa and other key locations. Aircraft services and the communications systems will be made available for the use of all relief partners.

100. WFP will be responsible for the coordination of logistics and for the delivery of WFP food supplies for general food distribution, supplementary feeding, demobilization programmes and market sales schemes in the north. At Mogadishu, supplies will be brought into the port in the name of WFP and handed over to CARE for onward delivery. WFP will provide food monitors. These will complement CARE's 3 expatriate and 15 national staff, who will assist in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. The WFP market sales programme is presently under preparation with CARE.

101. UNHCR continues to have primary responsibility for all matters relating to refugees and returnees. Under the 90-day Plan, UNHCR will continue to work closely with other United Nations agencies and NGOs in the provision of activities for refugee-impacted areas and to pre-position supplies in readiness for its planned repatriation programme for refugees still to return from Ethiopia. Demining activities will be accelerated, if security conditions permit.

102. UNICEF will be responsible for the coordination of non-food assistance and will increase its international staff presence in regions to be targeted for assistance. UNICEF will also significantly increase the number of Somali contract staff in order to serve as non-food relief assistance monitors, as well as enable its own direct implementation of water, health care, immunization and other essential non-food relief programmes.

103. WHO will continue to provide support for all areas of Somalia through international NGOs and where possible with health authorities and with national relief agencies. WHO will support therapeutic feeding centres through the provision of UNIMIX and will supply emergency health and drug kits

for health care centres and hospitals. As soon as security permits, WHO will embark on the rehabilitation of the health system and establish a health information and disease surveillance system, training programmes and the repair and rehabilitation of health facilities.

104. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) will continue to support the reactivation of the agricultural and livestock sectors through the provision of seeds and tools, pesticides and veterinary programmes, including livestock watering points and mobile clinics for livestock vaccination.

105. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme has already submitted a proposal for the provision of up to 50 voluntary specialists who can assist the various United Nations agencies and relief organizations in carrying out their work under the 90-day Plan and on longer-term programmes. The recruitment and fielding of UNVs in support of a wide variety of activities, including logistics, communications, agriculture and health, will be undertaken in response to specific requests made by United Nations agencies and other organizations, including NGOs.

Annex

LOGISTICS OVERVIEW

A. Mogadishu

1. The port of Mogadishu is technically sound. Five of the six berths are open. Berth No. 4 is closed because of a sunken tug boat. There is also a sunken tug boat near the breakwater. The port has two operational tugboats and one pilot boat. The port sheds in berths No. 1 to 3 were damaged in the January 1992 looting.

2. The port handling equipment has been looted and is available for hire on the private market. The port has two mobile cranes although it is unclear whether they are functioning.

3. The port administration and labour force are, for the most part, still at Mogadishu living in both the Aidid and Mahdi areas of the city. The port administration building is still intact. The port does not have any electricity as the generator is damaged and all electrical wiring has been looted. There are many containers scattered around the port, many of which have been damaged in the fighting.

4. Access to roads to and from the port are in good condition. There appears to be ample supply of trucks on the local market. While most are single-owned operators, two larger transport entities continue to function. Both are based in the Aidid part of the city. There is a severe shortage of fuel since the looting and subsequent fire in the Mogadishu fuel depot. All relief shipments must be accompanied with fuel supplies for onward transport.

5. The Mogadishu road network appears basically intact and in good condition. However, because of the looting of the city's underground wiring network which has left deep trenches next to many roads, it is feared that the rains will cause irreparable damage to many streets.

6. Currently the traditional Mogadishu international airport in the southern part of the city, controlled by the Hawadle sub-clan in an area bordering Aidid's sector, and an airstrip 12 kilometres north of the city in the Mahdi-controlled area are used for the delivery of relief assistance. The Mogadishu south airport can receive any type of aircraft, while the Mogadishu north airstrip can receive only C-130 or Antonov-12 class aircraft. Labour is available at both sites. Access to the Mogadishu south airport is good, but the access road to Mogadishu north is a sandy track, which may be affected by the rain.

B. North-west Somalia

7. Although control of Berbera port is contested between the armed factions in north-west Somalia, the port is technically operational. Commercial traffic continues to move through Berbera port and some handling equipment is reportedly still with the port authorities.

8. The road network in the north-west is intact and usable although traffic is limited owing to insecurity. There is a good supply of trucking capacity in the region, although fuel supplies are irregular. Traders continue to rely on dhow traffic to the ports of Zeila for the Boroma area and Mait for the Erigavo and Las Anod areas.

C. North-east Somalia

9. Bosaso port is reportedly intact and is being used by commercial traffic. This traffic consists primarily of coastal vessels and dhows, although larger vessels are possible.

D. Central Somalia

10. The main entry points in the region are the coastal ports. ICRC has recently completed a survey of minor coastal ports in Somalia from the Kenya border north to Obbia. This report has a wealth of information, including maps, slides and videos, concerning possible maritime relief operations to these ports. The principle conclusion of the report is that during the upcoming rainy season, beginning in mid-May until September, use of most of these ports for landing craft or off-shore ship-to-ship operations will not be feasible.

11. While the use of Gezira and Warsheik ports to meet the needs of Mogadishu had been discussed, it is felt that because of technical constraints these ports will not be able to accommodate the massive food input that Mogadishu requires.

E. South-east Somalia

12. The port of Kismayo is intact with four of the five berths open. A sunken navy boat has closed one berth down. The port, however, has no tug boat or pilot boat. Small coastal vessels carrying commercial traffic from Mombasa and passenger traffic to and from Bosaso regularly call at the port. The port sheds, with a capacity of 5,000-7,000 tons, are in good condition and are being used by ICRC. The access road to the town is in good condition. Local transport appears to be in good supply, although fuel is a problem and must accompany any incoming relief shipment. Roads emanating from Kismayo north to Gelib and Brava are plagued with banditry.

F. South-west Somalia

13. Traditionally this region was served by Mogadishu and Kismayo ports, but because of insecurity, this is no longer possible. The main points of entry in use presently are overland from Kenya via El Wak and via Mandera. The routes are traditionally affected by rain during mid-May to September. The Baidoba airport is reported to be open.

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

1. In paragraph 63 of my report to the Security Council (S/23829), I indicated my intention to circulate an addendum to the report which would contain a preliminary cost estimate for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

2. As outlined in paragraphs 22 to 33 of the above-mentioned report, the agreements reached in Mogadishu require the United Nations to deploy military observers to monitor the cease-fire and to deploy United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities in continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to displaced persons in and around Mogadishu.

3. It is estimated that the cost associated with the emplacement and maintenance of UNOSOM, consisting of 550 military and security personnel and 79 civilian personnel, including 40 locally recruited staff, for an initial six-month period would be approximately $23.1 million. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main objects of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to this addendum.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council agree to the deployment of UNOSOM, that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a Special Account to be established for this purpose.

Annex

Six-month cost estimates by objects of expenditure

(In thousands of United States dollars)

	Objects of expenditure	
1.	Military and security component	
	(a) Military observers	959
	(b) Security personnel, pay and allowances	3 430
	(c) Other costs	2 780
2.	Civilian personnel, including travel to mission area	2 745
3.	Accommodation including premises, construction and maintenance	4 410
4.	Vehicle operations	2 000
5.	Aircraft operations	2 367
6.	Communications	1 458
7.	Miscellaneous equipment	1 291
8.	Miscellaneous supplies, services freight and support costs	1 660
	Total estimate (gross)	23 100